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7SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the apartment during the entire week prior to service of process. 54 The
court cited Pickford v. Kravetz,5 5 in which it had been held that a hotel
where defendant was a guest for one week constituted his dwelling
place. It noted that "Warren Avis' connection with the Park Avenue
apartment is considerably greater than a transient's nexus to a hotel."5 6
The court's construction of "dwelling place" as being broader than
"residence" is a most pragmatic one. For, "[i]n a highly mobile society
it is unrealistic to interpret CPLR 308(2) as mandating service at only
one location where, in fact, a defendant maintains several dwelling
places." 57 Furthermore, such decision is in accord with the underlying
purpose of CPLR 308(2), i.e., to assure fair notice to the defendant.58
It cannot be argued seriously that delivery of process to an individual
of suitable age and discretion at an apartment such as the one discussed
above, is not well calculated to give fair notice to the defendant.5 9
ARTICLE 10-PARTES GENERALLY
CPLR 1005(a): New York court refuses to extend basis for class actions.
With the advent of the consumer protection movement, there has
been an upsurge in interest in the class action.60 In the recent case of
Zachary v. R. H. Macy & Co.,61 the Supreme Court, New York County,
declined to liberalize the requirements for instituting such actions.
While deploring the inadequacy of solutions, the court concluded that
plaintiff Zachary could not institute a class action. Zachary alleged that
Macy's bookkeeping system imposed interest upon previous financing
charges, but was not a proper party because her account had not yet
been charged such interest.62
54 Id.
55 17 FED. RUL.s SERv. 4th 121, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
56 326 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
57 Id. at 1329. See also C. WRIGHT g- A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRALcrTc AND PRocEDURu
§ 1096, at 368 (1969), where Federal Rule 4(d)(1), the federal parallel to CPLR 308, is
discussed.
In a highly mobile society in which 'summer' and 'winter' homes are becoming
more and more common, it is unrealistic to interpret Rule 4(d)(1) so that the
person to be served only has one dwelling house or usual place of abode at which
the process may be left. In the same vein, it makes little sense to construe Rule
4(d)(1) technically when actual notice has been received .. "
58 See 7B MCKmNEY's CPLR 308, supp. commentary at 203 (1966).
59 326 F. Supp. at 1329.
60 For a comprehensive survey of the use of the class action in consumer suits, see
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 BosToN L. REV.
211 (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action -Part II: Considerations of Procedure, id.
407 (1969). See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BuFtALO L. Rv. 433 (1960).
6166 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
62 Id. at 976-77, N.Y..2d at 760. The court also refused to allow Zachary to maintain an
individual suit, since she had not been injured. Id., 323 N.Y.S.2d at 762. Additionally, the
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New York's concept of the class action has undergone only slight
revision since its initial appearance in the Field Code in 1848.63 Never-
theless, finding a representative to commence the action is no simple
matter. Actions have been denied in cases where the question raised,6 4
the remedy sought,65 or the defenses available66 differed with each
party. Not only must a class representative show a cause of action, but
he must also show "that he is bound by a 'unity of interest' with other
members of the alleged class."67
In the instant case the court provided no guidance as to what
actually constitutes the "unity of interest" demanded. Previously, an
alleged class action based on similarity of contracts had been disallowed
by the Court of Appeals. 65 Although recognizing that other jurisdic-
tions, including the federal, are much more receptive to class actions,6 9
the Zachary court refused, under stare decisis, to extend the New York
rule.70
If higher courts are not willing to extend CPLR 1005(a) by over-
ruling or limiting Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America,71 which viewed
the class action restrictively, legislative reevaluation is clearly necessary.
The consumer must have a viable class action weapon.72
court refused to allow Salacuse, a co-plaintiff, to bring an individual action, since Macy's
charge policy, while open to criticism, was not illegal under New York Law. Id. at 979-80,
323 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63, construing N.Y. PEns. PRop. LAw § 413 (McKinney 1962).
637B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1005, supp. commentary at 62 (1970).
64 Gledhill v. Best & Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 541, 304 N.YS.2d 284 (Ist Dep't 1969), appeal
dismissed, 26 N.Y.2d 703, 257 N.E.2d 48, 308 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1970).
65 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965).
66 Id.
67 66 Misc. 2d at 977, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 760. A class action requires both a common in-
terest and common facts among all members. Such actions have been largely limited to
cases involving "closely associated relationships growing out of trust, partnership or joint
venture, and ownership of corporate stock," Hall v, Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d
596, 402, 259 N.E.2d 720, 722, 511 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1970).
Other types of class actions have been dismissed on the theory that "[s]eparate wrongs to
separate persons, though committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan,
do not create a common or general interest in those who are wronged." Society Milion
Athena v. National of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1959).
68 Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 596, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.,d 201
(1970), discussed in 7B McKINNuY's CPLR 1005, supp. commentary at 62 (1970) and The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S LAw REv, 500, 515 (1971).
69 66 Misc. 2d at 978-79, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
70 Id. at 981, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 764:
The actions herein represent an idea whose time may have come, but perhaps
unfortunately, not in the courts of the State of New York. No matter how one
studies the applicable case and legislative history, the result is the same.
1126 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1970).
172 While advantages to the plaintiff utilizing the class action include those of an
economic and procedural nature, imagine the profound impact upon public
opinion, the jury, and the opposing party when there exists a class of 1,000 plain-
tiffs suing for $500 each, instead of a single plaintiff prosecuting his action in
the conventional manner.
The Quarterly Survey, 45 Sr. JOHN's L REv. 500, 515-16 (1971).
[Vol. 46:355
